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INTRODUCTION
This Article contends that the Federal Communications Commission’s
(FCC) structural organization in “silos” that match up with technologies it
regulates—media, wireline and wireless—should be replaced with an organization based on functions—policy, economics, licensing, grantmaking, and
*
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him one of the 30 most influential communications lawyers. Honig also serves pro bono as
chief counsel for the Florida State Conference of the NAACP. He holds a B.A. in Mathematics
from Oberlin College, an M.S. in Systems Analysis from the University of Rochester, and a J.D.
cum laude from Georgetown University.
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engineering. To accomplish this, the FCC would create three new bureaus—
Policy and Economics, Licensing and Grantmaking, and Engineering—and
modestly restructure its Enforcement Bureau.
The silo-based organization of the FCC dated from the 1930’s, and it
was appropriate in its time. However, with the growing convergence of
technologies, the retention of silo-based organization will lead to inefficiencies, suboptimal regulatory outcomes, and irrationally non-neutral treatment of
technological platforms.
A sleeper in this debate is the impact of a potential function-based
reorganization of the FCC on its civil rights regulatory responsibilities: equal
employment opportunity (EEO), equal transactional opportunity, equal procurement opportunity, and advertising nondiscrimination. This Article describes
why a function-based FCC would dramatically improve the FCC’s ability to
administer its civil rights management and enforcement duties. With all civil
rights functionality centralized and operated with best practices across all
technologies, a functionally-structured FCC would be in a position to deliver
equal opportunity to all corners of the industries that constitute one-sixth of the
economy, that define our democracy and our culture, and that make us who we
are as a people.
I. HOW THE FCC ADVANCES CIVIL RIGHTS
For five decades, the FCC has led the federal government in advancing
diversity in the industries it regulates. In 1968, the FCC became the first federal
agency to require its licensees to practice nondiscrimination in employment.1
Ten years later, in 1978, the Commission became the first federal agency to
adopt policies fostering minority ownership of licensed facilities.2
These actions were taken by design rather than by accident. The FCC
does not regulate widgets—it regulates the most influential industries in the
world. Our democracy hinges on the thoughtful FCC oversight of these
industries. The framers of the Communications Act of 1934 appreciated this,
having created the FCC to regulate “interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all
the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service.”3 Congress in 1996 improved upon that
formulation by adding the words “without discrimination on the basis of race,
1

Nondiscrimination in the Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968).
Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978).
3
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
2
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color, religion, national origin, or sex.”4 Congress has acted favorably, or has
not stood in the way, as the FCC developed a broad range of regulations
governing equal employment opportunity,5 equal transactional opportunity,6
advertising nondiscrimination,7 and equal procurement opportunity8—as well
as policies designed to foster ownership of media and telecom facilities by
minorities and women.9
Beginning in 1995, the scope of the FCC’s actions has been limited by
court decisions holding that such rules and policies must be race-neutral even
where there is overwhelming evidence of systemic discrimination.10 While the
4

47 U.S.C. § 151 (providing language added in the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
See 47 U.S.C. § 334 (discussing the Commission’s equal employment opportunity regulations
that apply to television broadcast station licensees and permittees); see also 47 U.S.C. § 554
(stating that Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded by any corporation, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, or trust engaged primarily in the management or operation of
any cable system; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.881, 47 C.F.R. § 90.168, and 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080
(providing broadcasting equal employment opportunity regulations); (47 C.F.R. § 22.321, 47
C.F.R. § 101.311, 47 C.F.R § 101.3, and 47 C.F.R § 101.4 (stating the regulations for common
carriers); and 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.920, 47 C.F.R § 25.601, 47 C.F.R § 74.996, 47 C.F.R § 76.71, 47
C.F.R § 76.73, 47 C.F.R § 76.75, 47 C.F.R § 76.77, 47 C.F.R § 76.79, 47 C.F.R § 76.1702, 47
C.F.R § 76.1702, 47 C.F.R § 76.1802, and 47 C.F.R § 100.51 (applying equal opportunity
regulations to multichannel video program distributors (“MVPDs”)).
6
47 C.F.R. § 73.2090 (adopted in U.S. FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 07294, FCC 16-1, PROMOTING DIVERSIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE BROADCASTING
SERVICES (Nov. 24, 2017) at 55772-3; see also U.S. FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N., 23 FCC
Rcd. 5922, 5939-40, IN THE MATTER OF PROMOTING DIVERSIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE
BROADCAST SERVICES, REPORT AND ORDER AND THIRD NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 Diversity Order].
7
Adopted in the 2008 Diversity Order, supra note 6, at 5941-42 (not codified in the C.F.R.).
8
47 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(E) (stating that the FCC must develop rules to ensure that an MVPD
shall “encourage minority and female entrepreneurs to conduct business with all parts of its
operation”). The rules are found at 47 C.F.R. § 76.75(e).
9
Some of these policies were short-lived, and their impact was often diluted by policies that
pulled in the opposite direction. See David Honig, McGannon Lecture on Communications
Practices and Ethics, Fordham University: How the FCC Helped Exclude Minorities from
Ownership of the Airwaves (Oct. 2006), http://mmtconline.org/lp-pdf/DH-McGannon-Lec
ture-100506.pdf (discussing broadcast ownership diversity).
10
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (holding that “any person,
of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest
judicial scrutiny”); see also Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 352-53
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the Commission’s broadcast EEO rule was an unconstitutional
race-based classification and the rule was subject to strict constitutional scrutiny because it was
“built on the notion that stations should aspire to a workforce that attains, or at least approaches,
proportional [racial] representation” and “oblige[d] stations to grant some degree of preference to
minorities in hiring.”); MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“MD/DE/DE Broadcasters”) (providing the rule “under which nonminorities are less likely to
5
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FCC brought fourteen employment discrimination cases to trial before administrative law judges in the 1970s,11 the agency has not brought such a case to trial
in the past twenty years, even though racial discrimination in broadcasting has
failed to abate and, in some respects, appears to have gotten worse.12
At the FCC, the toolbox available to civil rights organizations to fight
discrimination contains only two sets of tools:
•

•

The first set of tools is race-conscious affirmative action,
which the FCC could pursue if it completed the “Adarand
studies” necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny13 and met the
requirement that it attempt essentially all race-neutral approaches before turning to race-conscious ones.14
The second set of tools is entirely race-neutral: the elimination of archaic regulations that operate as market entry
barriers for new entrants such as minority broadcasters.
The Multicultural Media, Telecom and Internet Council
(MMTC)15 has become proficient at identifying these entry
barriers and persuading the FCC to deregulate them—often
in partnership with industry leaders who are equally happy
to see the archaic rules go away. A prime example was the
FCC’s unanimous 2013 decision to relax restrictions on
foreign investment in broadcast licensees16—reversing a
xenophobic 1912 policy that had foreclosed most access to
overseas capital by American broadcasters, including Asian

receive notification of job openings solely because of their race” is “subject to strict scrutiny”).
11
See, e.g., Leflore Broadcasting Co., Hearing Designation Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 101 (1972).
This extraordinary enforcement record owes much to the leadership of FCC General Counsel
and later Commissioner and Chairman Richard Wiley, and Commissioner and later NAACP
Executive Director Benjamin Hooks.
12
See, e.g., U.S. FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N., MM DOCKET NO. 98-204, COMMENTS OF THE
MINORITY MEDIA AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL IN RESPONSE TO THE THIRD
REPORT AND ORDER AND FOURTH NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (May 22, 2008)
(providing an analysis of Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) data
showing that by 2006, minorities had virtually been purged from English language, nonminority owned radio journalism).
13
See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 224 (holding that “all racial classifications
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.”).
14
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733-35 (2007).
15
The MMTC was known as the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council from
1986 through 2014.
16
See Commission Policies and Procedures under Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act,
Foreign Investment in Broadcast Licensees, Declaratory Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd. 16244 (2013).
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American, Latino and Caribbean American companies.
Another example can be found in the FCC’s 2015 decision
to authorize certain classes of small, technologically inferior
AM stations disproportionately populated by minority owned
broadcasters to have top priority in the queues to obtain the
FM translators that have become essential to the survival of
these AM stations.17
But there are limits to the usefulness of these two sets of tools.
First, the FCC has failed to perform the Adarand studies despite two
court orders manifesting an expectation that the Commission will conduct the
studies,18 and certainly the FCC has not come close to attempting all of the
many race-neutral approaches19 that have been sitting before it for consideration for years.20 Second, there is only so much that any agency can deregulate,
and deregulation is not always beneficial.
Fortunately, a third and powerful set of civil rights tools may be
available: reorganization of the FCC itself.
II. THE FCC’S ORGANIZATION BY TECHNOLOGY “SILOS”
Today the FCC contains three major bureaus operating as technology
“silos”: the Media Bureau, covering radio, television, cable, and direct broadcast satellites;21 the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, which handles
17

Revitalization of the AM Radio Service, First Report and Order, Further Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, and Notice of Inquiry, 30 FCC Rcd.12145, 12152 (2015) (“We
further direct the Bureau . . . to make the first window available only to applications to modify
and/or relocate FM translator stations rebroadcasting Class C and D AM stations. [W]e
believe that Class C and D AM stations, because of their lack of limited power or lack of
protected nighttime service, will benefit most from the acquisition of a cross service
translator, and thus should be afforded the first opportunity to obtain one.”).
18
See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 467-68, 471 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“Prometheus II”) (providing that “if the Commission requires more and better data to
complete the necessary Adarand studies, it must get the data and conduct up-to-date studies,
as it began to do in 2000 before largely abandoning the endeavor”); see also Prometheus
Radio Project v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33, 49 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Prometheus III”) (stating that the
Commission “must make a final determination as to whether to adopt a new [eligible entity]
definition. If it needs more data to do so, it must get it.”).
19
As is required by Parents Involved, supra note 14, at 733-35.
20
See Prometheus III, supra note 18, at 50 n. 11 (remanding with the understanding that the
FCC will consider 17 race-neutral MMTC proposals); see also infra note 71.
21
See 47 C.F.R. § 0.61 (providing that “the Media Bureau develops, recommends and administers
the policy and licensing programs for the regulation of media, including cable television,
broadcast television and radio, and satellite services in the United States and its territories”).
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cellular, paging, personal communications services, public safety, and other
commercial and private radio services, as well as competitive bidding for
spectrum auctions;22 and the either optimistically or oxymoronically named
Wireline Competition Bureau, which regulates local and long distance common
carriers: voice, data, and other telecommunication transmission services.23 The
FCC also houses several function-based bureaus and offices whose jurisdictions cross technological boundaries, including the Office of General
Counsel, the Enforcement Bureau and the International Bureau.
The “silo” model of communications industry regulation “views each
industry sector as a distinct set of entities that do not interact and which should
be regulated under different principles.”24
The FCC’s “silo” structure wasn’t planned; it is the product of history.
The silo model emulates the Communications Act, which predates most modern
telecommunications technology.25 Thus, the current statute classifies these
industries under separate and often anachronistic designations of “media,”
“information services” and “telecommunications services.” Yet nowhere in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996—much less in the Communications Act of
1934—are there mentions of apps, Operating Systems (OS) providers, handsets,
or over-the-top (OTT) content.26
What this means is that rules and policies affecting one industry tend
to get developed in the bureau charged with regulating that industry—thus
virtually ensuring that there will be considerable differences between otherwise-comparable sets of rules and policies governing other industries on the
same subject matter.
22

See 47 C.F.R. § 0.131 (stating that the Bureau is responsible for all spectrum auctions).
See 47 C.F.R. § 0.91 (discussing the Wireline Competition Bureau).
24
H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & David A. Irwin, The First Great Telecom Debate of the 21st
Century, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 373, 379 n. 26 (2007), http://scholarship.law.edu/
commlaw/vol15/iss2/4/.
25
Randolph J. May, “Why Stovepipe Regulation No Longer Works: An Essay on the need
for a New Market-Oriented Communications Policy,” 58 FED. COMM. L. J. 103, 104 (2006),
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1423&context=fclj
(providing “the stovepipes, or vertical ‘silos’ or ‘smokestacks’ as some prefer, refer to the
distinct set of regulations that attach to a service offering once it is classified under one
definition or the other”).
26
Operating System, COMPUTER HOPE (Apr. 2017), https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/
o/os.htm. (An OS is software that provides common services for computers and manages
computer hardware and software resources. To function properly, a computer program must
have an OS. OTT is a term used for the transmitting of audio, video, and other media via the
internet without requiring its users to subscribe to a traditional pay service, such as Comcast);
Barry Levine, MarTech Landscape: What is OTT Programming and Why Does It Matter?,
MARTECH (July 2016), https://martechtoday.com/marketing-landscape-ott-programmingmatter-184073.
23
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Throughout the FCC’s first two generations, several distinguished
reports recommended extensive reforms in FCC top-line governance and
decision-making, while taking for granted or not addressing the silo model for
operations and management.27 More recently, though, as technologies have
converged (such as separate media becoming a single IP network), the silo
model has become the subject of extensive criticism.28 In 2012, Commissioner
(now Chairman) Ajit Pai declared that:
Today, the FCC operates under a Communications Act that was
last substantially revised in 1996—an Act that divides the
communications marketplace into silos of technologies and
services. Convergence and competition have rendered this
approach hopelessly outdated, as voice, video, and data are
quickly becoming just packets of information carried on the
27

See Harry M. Shooshan, A Modest Proposal for Restructuring the Federal Communications Commission, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 637, 640 (May 1998), www.repository.law.indi
ana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=fclj (recommending replacement of the
multimember commission with a single administrator); see also HENRY GELLER, THE
FEDERAL STRUCTURE FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 21 (Benton Foundation ed. 1989)
(recommending, inter alia, a “Single Executive Branch administrator for telecom policy,
housing but not controlling an independent agency to deal with electronic mass media
matters”); PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 14 (1971) [hereinafter Ash Council Report] (recommending a
strong chair but recommending no changes in the agency’s bipartisan, multimember structure
and not addressing bureau organization); SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT 65 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by James M. Landis) [hereinafter
Landis Report] (recommending a strong chair accountable directly to the President, but not
addressing bureau organization); COMM. ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, A Report to Congress, 5-6
(1949) [hereinafter Hoover Commission Report], https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001
141813 (recommending a strong executive chairman but not calling into question the
underlying multimember commission model or addressing bureau organization).
28
See, e.g., Richard Adler, Rapporteur, Rethinking Communications Regulation, REP. OF THE
27TH ANN. ASPEN INST. CONF. ON COMM. POL’Y v (2013) [hereinafter Aspen 2013], http://
csreports.aspeninstitute.org/documents/Rethinking-Communications-Regulation.pdf (providing that “in a world of converged media and communications, the current American
regulatory framework still has silos of regulation that divide communications policy into
distinct categories, essentially creating separate regulatory treatment for telephony, broadcasting, cable television, mobile and private communications, not to mention handset
vendors, providers of operating systems, apps developers and so-called over-the-top players
. . . . As the Internet and other information and communications technologies grow
exponentially, and as a new ecosystem is emerging that could conflate previously distinct
methods of communication into a single digital medium, questions arise as to whether these
silos of regulation are still appropriate.”).
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same networks. Cable operators offer phone and Internet services. Telecommunications carriers promote video service.
Voice over Internet Protocol (or VoIP) providers sell voice
service and video teleconferencing. Companies like Netflix use
the Internet to deliver video service. And wireless providers,
once known for selling phones the size of a brick, let ever more
mobile consumers watch videos, listen to music, play games,
and occasionally make a call, all on the go.29
A year later, Commissioner Pai “acknowledged that the FCC is
‘hopelessly constrained’ by the existing regulatory silos based on distinctions
between media, and that it ‘gets into absurd contortions’ when it attempts to
develop sensible regulations given these constraints.”30 University of Florida
economist Mark Jamison has concluded that:
There seems to be a growing consensus that the FCC’s
structure31 is outdated and hinders its work. What should be
done? Implement a structure that moves away from antiquated
silos—wireline, wireless, and media—to one that reflects the
dynamic digital ecosystem and that empowers sound analytical
work.”32 Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has gone farther,
recommending that “[t]he agency should be reorganized
forthwith according to functions with industry silos disbanded.
No employee should be permitted to remain within a particular
functional unit for more than five years.33
Some critics of the silo model have been particularly skeptical of the
model’s inherent diminishment of the impact of economics in FCC decisionmaking. Citing the benefits of benefit-cost analysis in evaluation of rules and its
29

Ajit Pai, Commissioner, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Opening Remarks Before the Internet
Transformation Panel of the Communications Liberty and Innovation Project, (Oct. 2012),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-316824A1.pdf.
30
Aspen 2013, supra note 12.
31
Organizational Charts of the FCC, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/aboutfcc/organizational-charts-fcc (last accessed Mar. 18, 2018).
32
Mark Jamison, Can We Modernize the FCC? TECH POL’Y DAILY (Feb. 2017), http://
www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/can-modernize-fcc/.
33
Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Communications Policy for 2006 and Beyond, 58
FED. COMM. L. J. 1, 33 (2006), www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1421&context=fclj.
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endorsement by the Bush I, Clinton, Bush II and Obama administrations,34 FCC
Chief Economist Thomas Hazlett describes how economic analysis has helped
improve the quality of administrative rules.35 Despite this, he observes that:
[E]conomic analysis, per se, generally enjoys only the support of
relatively weak constituencies within the regulatory agency.
Agencies have agendas that, loosely stated, are crafted to maximize support for their political benefactors (coalition partners)
subject to the constraint the basic constitutional rules are obeyed.
The social impacts of keenest interest are reliably communicated
by coalition partners. Independent economic analysis of social
welfare is neither necessary nor definitive . . .
The institutional problem is to create new structures, presumably
with in regulatory agencies, that reduce the free rider problem
associated with economic analysis. This can, potentially, be
achieved by endowing offices or divisions within agencies with
the authority to conduct economic analysis of regulatory choices.
Where such offices are controlled by economists, and endowed
with immeasurable autonomy and influence, they can help
advance the professional priorities of an important set of experts
within the regulatory agency.36
Hazlett notes that at the FCC there is:
[N]o location anywhere in the organizational structure devoted
primarily to economic analysis. This includes 10 offices and
seven bureaus. While the Office of Strategic Plans and Policy
Analysis (OSP) includes economists, it is primarily staffed by
non-economists, has been traditionally headed by a noneconomist, and has been reshuffled and renamed by recent FCC
Chairman. There is a Chief Economist (CE) at the FCC, academic visitor who serves a short-term (one-year or two-year)
appointment made by the Commission Chair. This position does
allow the FCC to receive professional economic advice, but of a
34

Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission: A Simple
Proposal to atone for Past Sins, Discussion Paper, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 1-2 (April 7,
2011), (available from David Honig) [hereinafter Hazlett] (citing Robert W. Hahn, Government
Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Regulation, 12 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 201, 202-3 (1998)).
35
Hazlett, supra note 34, at 4.
36
Id. at 6.
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very limited sort. Personnel can be assigned to assist the CE on
an ad hoc basis, but there is no professional staff dedicated to
serve under the direction of the CE. This and the short duration
of appointments, mitigate against long-term influence in rule
makings that typically take many years to evolve.37
To cure these ailments, Hazlett proposes the creation of an Office of
Economic Analysis, which would be an “institutional home for economists,
well-trained in analytical concepts and highly competent in evaluating welfare
changes associated with FCC regulation, to appraise policy issues at the agency
and thereby influence agency outcomes. This program will succeed in raising
the quality of regulatory decision-making to the degree that such economists
are independent and insulated from the conclusions reached by other policy
analyst of the agency, and are actively engaged in the process of writing
Notices, Rulemakings, Reports and Orders.”38 Hazlett concludes that:
The basic requirements for creating an Office of Economic Analysis of the FCC is that a critical mass of economic expertise be
assembled in one location; that the office be directed by the
economist of high rank and authority within the agency; that the
office be given latitude to select research teams relevant study
projects, and to thereby acquire deep knowledge of relevant
markets and policies; that the staff professionals be active in
scholarly research; and that this sophisticated analytical base
productively participates in FCC policymaking. This latter, most
important, condition requires ready access to the FCC chair, to
other commissioners, and the bureau chiefs outside of [the Office
of Economic Analysis].39
In its proposal for the creation of a Bureau of Policy and Economics,40 this
article draws heavily on Hazlett’s approach.
When considering the break-up of silos, it is important to recognize that
silos are not entirely foreign to one another. Nor could they be; nearly all of the
FCC’s 1,688 employees41 work in the same eight-story building, and they share
37

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 16 (noting that his proposal “leans heavily on the 2004-05 proposal of Martin Perry”).
39
Id. at 19-20.
40
See id. at 11-13 (discussing the proposal).
41
Employee Profile at the FCC, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general/
employee-profile-fcc#block-menu-block-4 (last accessed Mar. 18, 2018).
38
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a nearby cafeteria. The Commission’s organization by silos does not mean that
all decisions reflecting one bureau’s technology-specific body of law are
always at odds with decisions reflecting other bureaus’ technology-specific
bodies of law. It is not uncommon for the agency to create cross-bureau task
forces of senior staff.42 Staff of the Media, Wireless and Wireline bureaus often
coordinate with one another to avoid inconsistent results, and the commissioners are sensitive to avoiding inconsistent or “platform skewed” outcomes.
Nonetheless, all of this inter-bureau coordination takes effort, and at best it is
a partial and incomplete workaround of silo design. Thus it often fails to
produce platform-neutral outcomes.
The Commission has not been inattentive to the need to reorganize by
function and to graduate from the silo paradigm. In recent years, even while
operating within the constraints of its current structure, the Commission has
extended regulatory parity to multiple contexts, including prohibiting exclusivity contracts in video and telecommunications services in residential multiple
tenant environments43 and, pursuant to Sections 338(a) and 338(j) of the
Communications Act,44 establishing comparability in the cable and satellite
carriage of digital-only stations.45 Most recently, the Commission eliminated
the correspondence file and principal headend public file requirements in order
to lessen the regulatory requirements imposed on commercial broadcasters and
cable operators, thus advancing regulatory parity with respect to public file
requirements among program distributors.46 The Commission noted that
42

Two examples: in 2002, the FCC formed the Spectrum Policy Task Force, which was
composed of senior staff from several Commission bureaus and offices. FCC Chairman Michael
K. Powell Announces Formation of Spectrum Policy Task Force, FCC News Release (June 6,
2002), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-223142A1.pdf. In 2012, the FCC
formed the Incentive Auction Task Force with staff of most Commission bureaus and offices “to
deploy market forces and a market-based mechanism to repurpose spectrum for flexible use,
including mobile broadband” in order to manage the most complex auction in history. Statement
of FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski on the Incentive Auction Task Force (Mar. 21, 2012),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-313140A1.pdf.
43
See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets (Report
and Order), 23 FCC Rcd 5385, 5387 ¶5 (2008) (“[I]n an environment of increasingly
competitive bundled service offerings, the importance of regulatory parity is particularly
compelling in our determination to remove this impediment to fair competition.”).
44
47 U.S.C. §§ 338(a) and 338(j).
45
See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals: Amendment to Part 76 of the Commission’s Rules; Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Local
Broadcast Signal Carriage Issues and Retransmission Consent Issues, 47 C.F.R. ¶76 (2008)
(“The Commission has required carriage of digital-only stations by cable operators, and a
similar requirement is both appropriate and comparable for satellite carriers.”).
46
Revisions to Public Inspection File Requirements – Broadcast Correspondence File and
Cable Principal Headend Location, 47 C.F.R. ¶73, 76 (2017).
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eliminating the correspondence file affords commercial broadcasters the same
opportunity as other entities with online file requirements to provide online
access to all public files, thus advancing regulatory parity.47
III. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: FCC REORGANIZATION BY FUNCTION
Let us suppose the FCC were reorganized entirely by function—meaning that the Media, Wireless and Wireline bureaus would be closed; three new
bureaus—Policy and Economics, Licensing and Grantmaking, and Engineering,
would be created; and an existing bureau, Enforcement, would be given additional
functions. The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, the Office of General Counsel, the International Bureau, and other offices would be unchanged.
In assigning the Media, Wireless, and Wireline bureaus’ functions to
other bureaus, the agency would essentially be transitioning from a model in
which the three technology silo-based bureaus were producing their “products”
(rules, licenses, and sanctions) in three separate product lines (media, wireless,
and wireline) to a new model in which bureaus of Policy and Economics, Licensing and Grantmaking, Engineering, and Enforcement would each be producing
separate but essential elements of these products, but across all product lines.
A new bureau of Licensing and Grantmaking would have at its only
purposes the issuance of licenses by granting routine applications or through
the administration of auctions; and administering the Universal Service Fund
(USF). These functions are classic “giving away stuff.” On its face, this
function does not belong in the same place as policy, economics or, especially,
enforcement.48 Further, to ensure platform neutrality, “giving away stuff”
across technologies certainly belongs in the same place.
Perhaps the most consequential outcome of reorganization of the
Commission by function would be the consolidation and elevation of economic
analysis into a Bureau of Policy and Economics. Heightening the role of
economic analysis in FCC decision-making has been a major theme of the Pai
administration.49 In April 2017, Chairman Pai specifically addressed the
inefficiencies attendant to the deployment of economics in silo-based bureaus:50
47

Id.
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.91 infra note 65 for more information on categories of functions.
49
Mark Jamison, Will Chairman Pai resurrect economics at the FCC?, AEI (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/will-chairman-pai-resurrect-economics-fcc/.
Dr. Jamison’s article reports on an address Chairman Pai delivered at the Hudson Institute,
Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Remarks at the Hudson Institute: The Importance
of Economic Analysis at the FCC (Apr. 5, 2017) in which the Chairman announced that he
intends to create an Office of Economics and Data as a first step toward elevating the role of
economics in FCC regulation.
50
Id.
48
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[E]conomists work in siloes. This impedes their productivity and
impairs agency efficiency. For example, at any given time,
economists in one Bureau can be quite busy. But economists in
another Bureau might not have much work. In a converged
marketplace, economists with expertise in one context may be
able to contribute significantly to addressing problems in
another. There can be great benefit from this cross-fertilization
of ideas. And our economists are capable of pinch-hitting if
needed in areas outside their specialty. The FCC has many
talented economists scattered across the agency, and I believe
there is great benefit to creating a place where economists can
work together on a greater variety of issues.
Now let’s put the FCC’s structure in context. Look across government at comparable agencies that handle competition and
consumer protection issues. The FTC’s Bureau of Economics
has nearly 80 Ph.D.-level economists. The Justice Department’s
Antitrust Division employs an Economic Analysis group. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has a Division of Economic and Risk Analysis. Each office is integrated into policymaking across their agencies or divisions. We don’t do this at
the FCC.
Indeed, Chairman Pai has already begun the task of upgrading
economic analysis within the FCC’s operating structure. In January 2018, the
Chairman, joined by two of the other four commissioners, issued an Order
creating the Office of Economics and Analytics (“OEA”), which will:
(A) provide economic analysis, including cost-benefit analysis
for rulemakings, transactions, adjudications, and other Commission actions;
(B) manage the FCC’s auctions in support of and in coordination
with FCC Bureaus and Offices;
(C) develop policies and strategies to help manage the FCC’s data
resources and establish best practices for data use throughout
the FCC in coordination with FCC Bureaus and Offices; and
(D) conduct long-term research on ways to improve the Commission’s policies and processes in each of these areas.51
51

U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., FCC 18-7, IN THE MATTER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE
OF ECONOMICS AND ANALYTICS, 1 (Jan. 30, 2018).
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Chairman Pai sees the OEA as a vehicle “to make sure economics does in fact
play a larger role at the FCC.”52
Operationalizing Chairman Pai’s dream and extending it into an
element of a full replacement of the silos model, here is what three new bureaus
and one restructured bureau might look like after the FCC is transitioned to an
entirely function-based structure:
Bureau of Policy and Economics
• Conducting and coordinating policy research and development
that is presently done in-house by and for the Office of Strategic
Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP);53
• Conducting policy research and development that’s currently
performed by OSP for other staff units, as well as rulemaking
proceedings and research currently performed by the Media,
Wireline, and Wireless Bureaus;54
• Making policy recommendations for the Commission directly,
including responsibilities currently performed by OSP, the
Wireline Bureau, and the Wireless Bureau.55
Bureau of Licensing and Grantmaking
• Issuing licenses and authorizations;56
• Conducting auctions;57
• Administering the Universal Service Fund.58
Engineering Bureau
• Conducting pure and theoretical engineering research, including
that presently being performed by OET;59
• Advising the Commission directly on engineering matters, including current OET responsibilities;60
52

Id. at 10 (Statement of Chairman Ajit Pai).
47 C.F.R. § 0.21(a), (e), (g), (h), (i).
54
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.21(b) and (j) (OSP); 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(b), (c) and (g) (Media Bureau); 47
C.F.R. §§ 0.91(e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (l) (Wireline Bureau); 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(e), (f), (g).
55
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.21(c), (d) and (f) (OSP); 47 C.F.R. § 0.91(a) (Wireline Bureau) 47 C.F.R.
§ 0.131(a) (policy and rulemaking functions); §0.131(b) (Wireless Bureau).
56
47 C.F.R. § 0.61(a) (Media Bureau); 47 C.F.R. §§0.131(a) (licensing functions); (j) (m),
(n), (p), and (s) (Wireless Bureau).
57
47 C.F.R. § 0.131(c) (Wireless Bureau).
58
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.91 (n), (p) (Wireline Bureau); 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(r) (Wireless Bureau).
59
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(c) and (e).
60
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(d) and (f).
53
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Conducting engineering research and administration that’s presently done in-house by and for the Office of Engineering and
Technology (OET);61
Assisting other bureaus and offices, including the Media,
Wireline, and Wireless Bureaus, with engineering issues and
research, including that currently performed by OET;62
Representing the Commission at international conferences and
with international coordination, including current OET and
Wireless Bureau assignments.63

Enforcement Bureau64
• Administer functions more closely related to enforcement than
to policy that are presently handled by the Media, Wireline or
Wireline Bureaus;65
• Assume enforcement responsibilities currently held by the
Media Bureau, such as broadcast and MVPD EEO, political
61

47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(i), (j), (l), and (m) (OET).
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(a), (g), (h), and (n).
63
47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(b) and (k) (OET); 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(h) and (k) (Wireless Bureau).
64
There would be a need for coordination between the Enforcement Bureau and the Licensing
and Grantmaking Bureau when a licensee’s basic qualifications are at issue, raising the question
of whether an applicant for a license or grant is qualified. See, inter alia, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e)
(providing designation for hearing on broadcast license applications); Universal Service Fund,
FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/universal-service-fund, (“The Telecommunications Act of
1996 expanded the traditional definition of universal service—affordable, nationwide telephone
service to include among other things rural health care providers and eligible schools and libraries.
Today, the FCC provides universal service support through four mechanisms: (1) High Support
Mechanism provides support to certain qualifying telephone companies that serve high cost areas;
(2) Low Income Support Mechanism assists low-income customers; (3) Rural Health Care Support Mechanism allows rural health care providers to pay rates for telecommunications services
similar to those of their urban counterparts, making telehealth services affordable; and (4) Schools
and Libraries Support Mechanism, popularly known as the ‘E-Rate,’ provides telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal connections to eligible schools and libraries.”).
65
Media Bureau ancillary functions include acting on “applications for authorization, petitions for special relief, petitions to deny, waiver requests, requests for certification,
objections, complaints, and requests for declaratory rulings and stays” in 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(h);
as well as § 0.61(i) (discussing consumer complaints), § 0.61(j) (discussing subpoenas), §
0.61(l) (providing public safety, this section is used to authorize waivers of broadcast station
power restrictions in emergencies), and § 0.61(k) (offering an all functions except reserved
provision). For Wireline Bureau ancillary functions, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.91(b) (providing
requests for interpretation or waiver of rules), § 0.91(k) (providing consumer complaints,
and § 0.91(m) (offering an all functions except reserved provision). For Wireless Bureau
ancillary functions, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.131(i) (providing consumer complaints), § 0.131(o)
(discussing subpoenas), and § 0.131(q) (discussing public safety).
62
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broadcasting, and SHVIA, the Wireline Bureau such as those
relating to license transfers, terminal attachments, and public
safety, and the Wireless Bureau such as regulation of charges,
practices, classifications, terms and conditions and facilities;66
Perform all current enforcement duties across all technologies.67

This arrangement has four advantages over the current state of affairs:
First, it would enhance efficiency by baking in platform neutrality.
Each technology would receive the same regulatory presumptions, standards
and benefits that other technologies receive—thus incentivizing innovation and
investment and reducing appellate litigation risks to the agency.
Second, it would incorporate into the organizational chart the lines of
communication that currently have to be created artificially through cross-bureau
task forces or, worse yet, through random communications among bureaus.68
Third, decision-making would automatically adjust to changes in
technology. Although media and telecom technologies change rapidly and
unexpectedly, the laws of economics, policy and engineering are immutable.
Thus the new structure would accommodate future technological evolution.
Fourth, it would naturally centralize similar functions in their logical
sites, with subject matter experts efficiently applying best practices across all
industries, to the great benefit of consumers, the underserved, and the taxpayers.
An especially salutary example of how this would happen can be found in civil
rights regulation, which is detailed in the following section of this article.
66

See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.61(d) (Media Bureau, EEO), 0.61(e) (providing political programming and
related matters), and 0.61(f) (providing miscellaneous broadcast and cable matters such as video
access to persons with disabilities and Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA)); 47
C.F.R. §§ 0.91(d) (providing license transfers and discontinuance of service), § 0.91(j) (providing
terminal attachments), and § 0.91(o) (public safety); § 0.131(d) (providing Wireless Bureau –
charges, practices, classifications, terms and conditions, and facilities).
67
47 C.F.R. § 0.111 (Enforcement Bureau).
68
This issue of cross-bureau relationships, and the broader issue of inter-agency relationships,
may have persuaded the Chairman to scale back a September 2017 internal trial balloon plan to
create a Bureau of Economics and Data and, instead, create in January 2018 the Office of
Economics and Analytics (OED). In a posting on the Technology Policy Institute blog, former
FCC chief economist (in 2014) Tim Brennan stated that “a separate bureau” could produce “a
‘Siberia’ effect: Pitting economists into a single place makes them easier to ignore . . . some staff
economists have expressed concerns that segregating economists into a separate office will inhibit
valuable collaborations with technologists and lawyers.” Further, Brennan contended having a
bureau of economics does not ensure that economists will have “a seat at the table when the FCC
makes decisions.” See Tim Brennan, Bolstering Economics at the FCC: Will a Separate Office
Help?, TECH. POLICY INST. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2017/09/18/bolster
ing-economics-at-the-fcc-will-a-separate-office-help/. The combination of economics and policy
in the same bureau, as proposed herein, might resolve the “Siberia” and related governance issues.
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IV. HOW WOULD FCC REORGANIZATION BY FUNCTION
IMPACT CIVIL RIGHTS?
One of the great advantages of function-based organization of the FCC
is that it would vastly improve the agency’s ability to advance the goal of full
inclusion of minorities and women in the nation’s most influential industries.
Under a functional structure, the FCC would naturally combine all of its civil
rights enforcement offices—across sector-specific rules and across multiple
technologies—in the Enforcement Bureau.69 Such an office would apply, to
civil rights, the FCC’s longstanding stated goals of regulatory parity and
platform neutrality—the principles that hold that all technologies are regulated
in the same way unless there are defensible reasons for regulating them
differently. Thus, the Bureau of Policy and Economics would handle all civil
rights policymaking.70
This means that the best practices of each element of civil rights
regulation would be implemented across the board for all technologies. For
example, the highly successful cable and MVPD equal procurement opportunity rule—which requires the dissemination of requests for proposals (RFPs)
broadly enough to reach all qualified contractors, including those owned by
minorities and women, would be extended to all technologies.71
69

The FCC is considering MMTC’s proposal to transfer broadcast and MVPD EEO
enforcement from the Media Bureau to the Enforcement Bureau. See U.S. FED. COMM.
COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 14-50, FCC 16-107, IN THE MATTER OF 2014 QUADRENNIAL
REGULATORY REVIEW, 144 (Aug. 10, 2016) (acknowledging that “enforcement of the Media
Bureau Equal Employment Opportunity rules, which is presently handled by the Media
Bureau, might be more appropriate as a function of the Enforcement Bureau, given the
Enforcement Bureau’s existing mission and expertise in the enforcement of the Commission’s regulations” and directing several bureaus and offices “to discuss the feasibility,
implications, and logistics of shifting the enforcement of the Media Bureau Equal
Employment Opportunity rules from the Media Bureau to the Enforcement Bureau.”).
70
It is well established that an instrumentality established to “promote” a technology is inherently
conflicted when also charged with enforcing proscriptive regulations against licensees using that
technology. A classic example is the 1974 re-establishment the National Transportation Safety
Board as a separate entity outside of the Department of Transportation, thus enabling the NTSB
to perform its investigative functions independently. See History of the National Transportation
Safety Board, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., https://www.ntsb.gov/about/history/Pages/default
.aspx (discussing the NTSB’s independence). Presently FCC broadcast and MVPD EEO
regulation is performed by the Media Bureau rather than the Enforcement Bureau. This anomaly
would be corrected naturally if the silo-based FCC structure were replaced with a functional
structure. In such event, broadcast and MVPD EEO enforcement would logically find its way
over to the Enforcement Bureau.
71
Erroneously claiming that it was outside the scope of the media ownership proceeding, the
Commission in 2014 failed to adopt a proposal by MMTC—backed by 57 national civil rights
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The advertising nondiscrimination rule and the transactional nondiscrimination rule each apply exclusively to broadcasting only because the
dockets giving birth to them in 2008 just happened to be broadcast (“MB” or
“Media Bureau”) dockets.72 But there is no logical reason why these rules
should not apply to other technologies. Under function-based regulation, they
would almost automatically apply to all technologies.
The grandmother of them all—EEO regulation—does apply across all
technologies, but the underlying rules and precedents are different for each
industry.73 The reasons for this patchwork of regulations go back 40 years, to
a time when the labor pools for the various regulated industries seldom
significantly overlapped. Today, however, the labor pools of most FCCregulated industries have largely converged—a fact the FCC recognized as far
back as 1999.74
The proposed reorganization of the FCC by functions rather than silos
would produce civil rights regulation that would be a vast improvement on the
current regulatory piecemeal quilt:
•
•

The rules would be consistent across platforms, and thus
more equitable than the current rules.
The rules would be administered by a single office populated
by a core staff of subject matter experts, using best practices

organizations—to extend the cable and MVPD procurement rule to all regulated communications
technologies. See U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N supra note 69. In 2016, the Third Circuit of the
U.S. Court of Appeals accepted the FCC’s word that, on remand, the FCC would consider the
procurement proposal at least as it related to the broadcasting industry. See Prometheus Radio
Project v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 824 F.3d 33, 50 (3d Cir. 2016). When the FCC again failed to
do so, the MMTC and the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters (NABOB)
petitioned for review once again. MMTC and NABOB v. FCC, No. 18-1670 (3d Cir., Apr. 5, 2018).
72
U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 07-294, IN THE MATTER OF PROMOTING
DIVERSIFICATION AND OWNERSHIP (June 16, 2008).
73
Differences among the rules include the number of recruitment initiatives a reporting unit
must engage in, different time periods for when these recruitment initiatives must occur,
religious affiliation requirements, and the implementation of reporting requirements.
Compare, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(c)(1) and (2) (discussing broadcasting) with 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.75(b)(1) and (2), and with §§ 76.77 (discussing cable). If there is a logical reason for
the differences in these regulations, it is not immediately apparent.
74
See A New Federal Communications Commission for the 21st Century, FCC, 4 (1999),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/fcc21.pdf, (“Convergence across communications industries is already taking place, and is likely to accelerate as competition develops further. Thus,
in addition to refocusing our resources on our core functions for a world of fully competitive
communications markets, the FCC must also assess, with the help of Congress and others,
how to streamline and consolidate our policymaking functions for a future where convergence has blurred traditional regulatory definitions and jurisdictional boundaries.”).
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drawn from all technologies. Thus they would be more costeffective, more efficient, and more responsive to the needs
being addressed by today’s patchwork of rules.
Since the rules would apply across all platforms, they would
provide greater coverage and extend current successful regulations throughout all of the industries touched by the FCC.

Industry leaders, including all of the major trade associations, have not
opposed extension of these rules across the board.75 They recognize that bad
actors drag down their industries, and that diversity improves companies’
bottom lines.76 They also recognize that diversity promotes competition, as
Commissioner Martin famously explained in approving new broadcast EEO
rules in 2002 in the wake of MD/DC/DE Broadcasters:
By choosing candidates from a larger, more diverse pool,
broadcasters and MVPDs will be better able to find the most
qualified candidates. A more talented workforce leads to improved programming, which ultimately benefits all consumers. The
program we adopt today therefore should promote not just
diversity, but also true competition.77

75

No one, including representatives of the broadcasting industry, opposed the FCC’s 2008
adoption of the broadcast advertising nondiscrimination rule and the broadcast transactional
nondiscrimination rule; and no one opposed the 2014 extension of the cable and MVPD
procurement rule to other technologies.
76
The social science data overwhelmingly demonstrates that diverse companies perform better
for their shareholders and for consumers. See, e.g., Why Diversity Matters, CATALYSt, 3 (July
2013), http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/why_diversity_matters_catalyst_0.pdf (reporting
that “[a] study that focused on 151 firms on the Australian Securities Exchange found that women
had a positive impact on economic growth and social responsiveness. Firms with two or more
women board directors had higher returns on equity, higher market-to-book value (M/B), and
improved corporate sustainability via higher social responsiveness,” and, “Catalyst’s 2004
research found that companies with the highest representation of women in senior leadership had
35 percent higher return on equity and 34 percent higher total return to shareholders”; see also
Cedric Herring, Does Diversity Pay?: Race, Gender, and the Business Case for Diversity, 74 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL R. 208 (2009) (finding that a racially diverse workforce was positively correlated
with more customers, increased sales revenue, greater relative profits, and greater market share,
and gender diversity is positively associated with increased sales revenue, more customers, and
greater relative profits).
77
U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., MM DOCKET NO. 98-204, FCC 02-303, IN THE MATTER OF
REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S BROADCAST AND CABLE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY RULES AND POLICIES (Nov. 7, 2002).
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V. THE PATHWAY FROM SILOS TO FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
Reorganization of the FCC is achievable but not without challenges.
Any reorganization of this magnitude would, unavoidably be somewhat
disruptive in the short run. The FCC would become dysfunctional for at least
a few weeks while it is recuperating, but that is the least of our worries. There
are many reasons why the FCC has resisted structural reform for decades.
Ever since the Communications Act of 1934 combined the telephone
and telegraph regulatory functions previously handled by the Department of
Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Commission with the radio regulatory
functions previously handled by the Federal Radio Commission,78 media and
telecom legislation has been organized by silos. This legislation has translated
itself into silo-based FCC operating units.79 There are reasons why silo-based
regulation has persisted for so many decades.
Perhaps the greatest hurdle to overcome in a transition from silos to
functions is the unavoidable skepticism of established incumbent companies that
are accustomed to the predictability and performance of “their” silos. Silo-based
lawmaking has worked well for some of the regulated industries, which have
enjoyed the opportunity to have “their” bureau (Media, Wireless or Wireline)
issue “products” (licenses and rules) that facilitate business in the markets in
which they operate, irrespective of whether the rules differ from those emanating
from competing industries’ bureaus. A shift to function-based bureaus would
produce platform-neutrality, but inevitably that means that someone’s platformadvantage becomes less advantaged for themselves, even if it advances equality,
free speech (and more speech), and competition for the public.
Nothing in the Communications Act prevents the Chairman of the FCC
from reorganizing the agency on his own. But as a practical matter, anything
as consequential as a major reorganization would need to be performed by, or
be closely supervised by Congress, which holds the agency’s purse strings. As
this is written, the FCC and most other parts of the federal government are
under a hiring freeze. A new function-based structure would probably require
about the same number of personnel as the current silo-based structure, but
relatively more economists. Thus, the FCC Chairman would need the
cooperation of Congress to be sure the new structure is fully staffed with the
skill sets he needs.
There is another reason why the FCC Chairman would be well advised
to rely on Congress to take the lead and act in a bipartisan way to effectuate a
transition from a silo-based to function-based FCC structure. Over the past
two decades, the FCC itself has come to be regarded as highly partisan, perhaps
78
79

STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMM. L. & POLICY, 52-53 (2nd ed. 2006).
Id. at 53-54.
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even more so than today’s Congress. Thus there will be resistance to restructuring the agency if the administration is perceived as using the reorganization
process to achieve unrelated deregulatory objectives that could not be achieved
as easily on their own. Those who disagree with the administration’s policy
directions might reasonably fear that any major reorganization of the FCC
could be used—even unintentionally—for the diminishment or downgrading
of staff units that study, administer, or enforce policy priorities with which the
administration disagrees, such as Title II internet regulation80 or enforcement
of the media structural ownership rules.81 The same fears would attach in
reverse if a reorganization of the agency were administered after 2020, when
members of the party not currently in power might lead the FCC.

80

See FCC Proposes Ending Utility-Style Regulation Of The Internet, FCC NEWS (May 18, 2017),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0518/DOC-344948A1.pdf.
81
See U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 14-50, FCC 14-28, IN THE MATTER OF
2014 QUADRENNIAL REGULATORY REVIEW – REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S BROADCAST
OWNERSHIP RULES AND OTHER RULES ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 202 OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (Mar. 31, 2014) (subsequent history omitted). On the
other hand, no one should fear that the Commission would use reorganization to undercut
the natural enhancement of civil rights enforcement that would naturally attend the
replacement of a silo-based structure with a functional structure. To be sure, it appears that
several federal agencies and departments’ civil rights enforcement programs are undergoing
severe cutbacks in their budgets or reversals of their substantive focus. See Letter of the
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and 99 Organizations to President
Donald J. Trump, (June 5, 2017), http://www.civilrights.org/advocacy/letters/2017/coali
tion_letter_civil_rights_enforcement.html; Juliet Eilperin et. al, Trump administration plans
to minimize civil rights efforts in agencies, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimize-civil-rights-efforts-in-agenci
es/2017/05/29/922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html. Cutbacks in civil rights enforcement and in support programs for minority, women and small businesses have
occurred in the past at the FCC; the author of this article had to obtain congressional
intervention to rescue FCC minority business offices from closure in 1981, 1989 and 2005.
This history contrasts sharply with the plans of the current Chairman, who has upgraded the
Commission’s small business office. See Chairman Pai Announces [Sanford] Williams to
Serve as Director of Communications Business Opportunities Team, FCC NEWS (June 7,
2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0607/DOC-345240
A1.pdf. Chairman Pai has also re-established the Advisory Committee on Diversity for Communications in the Digital Age, now re-named the Advisory Committee on Diversity and
Digital Empowerment, which was not re-chartered in 2013 under the previous Chairman.
See FCC Seeks Nominations for Membership on Advisory Committee on Diversity and
Digital Empowerment, FCC NEWS (June 7, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Relea
ses/Daily_Business/2017/db0607/DA-17-557A1.pdf. Recently the Chairman announced a
broad set of civil rights initiatives aimed at bridging the digital divide. See Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Remarks at MMTC’s 9th Annual Broadband and Social Justice
Summit, Washington, DC (Feb. 6, 2018).
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In light of these entirely foreseeable political considerations, a congressional task force focused on efficiency and cost-saving, with the gravitas of
the Landis, Ash, or Hoover Commissions,82 would need to persuade Congress
that a functional structure is preferable to a silo-based structure from the standpoint of good government.
CONCLUSION
Organizing by function rather than by technology silos would have
many benefits. The FCC would be in a better position to ensure consistency of
treatment of technologies as technologies change, thereby producing fairness,
efficiency, and a measure of economic stability in regulation that would enhance the overall investment potential of the tech sector.
High on the list of reasons why the FCC should be reorganized by
function rather than by silo is that a function-based FCC would lead to more
effective civil rights management and enforcement. That, in turn, would yield
greater participation by minorities and women in the media and telecom industries. The Commission’s obligation to regulate in the public interest by
eliminating discrimination is just as compelling in one of its regulated
industries as it is in any other. Platform neutrality and regulatory parity, delivered through functional reorganization of the FCC, can help deliver us to this
Promised Land.
Please, FCC, reorganize thyself!

82

Harry M. Shooshan, supra note 27.

